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OPINION OF THE COURT 
_______________ 
 
KRAUSE, Circuit Judge. 
 The Fifth Amendment protects the liberty of all 
persons within our borders, including aliens in immigration 
proceedings who are entitled to due process of law—that is, a 
meaningful opportunity to be heard—before being deported.  
In this case, we are called upon to clarify our case law and to 
demarcate the boundaries of the due process owed to aliens in 
removal hearings.  Because we conclude that the Immigration 
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Judge here denied Petitioner this fundamental right by 
actively preventing him from making his case for asylum, 
withholding of removal, and protection under the Convention 
Against Torture (CAT), we will grant the petition for review 
of the Board of Immigration Appeals’ affirmance and will 
vacate and remand for rehearing, urging reassignment on 
remand to a different Immigration Judge.   
I.   Factual and Procedural Background1 
 Petitioner Ever Ulises Serrano-Alberto, a widely 
acclaimed professional soccer player, fled to the United States 
from his native country of El Salvador to escape violence at 
the hands of the notorious Mara Salvatrucha gang, commonly 
known as MS13.  Serrano-Alberto was born and raised in the 
town of Apopa outside of San Salvador, the capital city of El 
Salvador, a nation consumed by gang warfare in recent years.  
Between approximately 2000 and 2008, Serrano-Alberto 
enjoyed a high-profile career in the Salvadoran national 
                                              
1 We begin with this factual summary of the events 
precipitating Serrano-Alberto’s case, the substance of which 
is principally derived from the evidence and allegations 
presented to the IJ before and during Serrano-Alberto’s 
removal hearing, to provide context for our discussion of that 
hearing.  It is, of course, within the exclusive province of the 
agency to make factual findings, Camara v. Att’y Gen., 580 
F.3d 196, 201 (3d Cir. 2009), and here—where we evaluate a 
petition for review alleging denial of due process and will 
grant the petition and remand for rehearing on that basis—the 
assigned IJ will determine the facts based on the new 
evidentiary record assembled before it.  See Johnson v. 
Ashcroft, 286 F.3d 696, 702-03 (3d Cir. 2002); Matter of Y-S-
L-C-, 26 I. & N. Dec. 688, 690-92 (BIA 2015). 
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soccer league, garnering significant attention as a result of his 
success.   
Serrano-Alberto’s fame, however, did little to insulate 
him from MS13 gang violence, and, indeed, appears to have 
made targets of both him and his family since at least 2007.  
At that point, suspected gang members shot his brother, 
Edwin, leaving him paralyzed.  The following year, according 
to Serrano-Alberto, the MS13 gang began to extort him for 
cash under threat of death.  Although he first acquiesced out 
of fear for his family members’ lives, and made six payments 
that fall, in November of 2008 he rejected the gang’s 
persistent demands and communicated that he would no 
longer comply.  Two weeks later, three suspected gang 
members shot Serrano-Alberto, his nephew, and a neighbor 
outside of Serrano-Alberto’s mother’s house, killing the 
neighbor and leaving Serrano-Alberto and his nephew 
hospitalized and in serious condition.  
The police came to speak with Serrano-Alberto once 
during his hospital stay.  Given the frequent collusion 
between the police and gang members, Serrano-Alberto was 
hesitant but willing to provide information.  The police, 
however, refused to take a report because Serrano-Alberto did 
not know the names of the people who shot him, and although 
the police said they would return to the hospital to talk with 
him further, they neither returned nor pursued an 
investigation.  In 2009, fearing further gang reprisal, Serrano-
Alberto twice attempted to flee the country but he was 
returned both times by Mexican authorities.   
Between late 2009 and May 2012, Serrano-Alberto 
was imprisoned in El Salvador on extortion charges of which 
he was ultimately absolved.  Even while he was imprisoned, 
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however, gang members continued to search for him, and 
they shot another one of his brothers when that brother 
refused to divulge Serrano-Alberto’s whereabouts.  
Immediately following his release from prison in 2012, 
Serrano-Alberto was targeted in yet another shooting—once 
again in his mother’s neighborhood—by unknown assailants 
on a motorcycle.  He narrowly escaped harm by diving under 
a nearby car.   
After that incident, Serrano-Alberto moved multiple 
times to evade detection by MS13, settling in October 2013 in 
La Gloria, San Salvador, where he lived and worked with an 
older brother.  During this time, his mother called and warned 
that gang members were continuing to pursue him with the 
intention of killing him, and soon after, in 2014, Serrano-
Alberto observed what he believed to be those gang members 
in his new neighborhood.  At that point, Serrano-Alberto fled 
to the United States.  
In July 2014, not long after crossing into Texas, 
Serrano-Alberto was apprehended and detained by 
Department of Homeland Security Border Patrol.  In 
December 2014, Serrano-Alberto applied for asylum, 
withholding of removal, and protection under the CAT, 
contending he feared persecution by gangs based on his 
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membership in an unspecified particular social group (PSG).2  
The manner in which the presiding IJ conducted Serrano-
Alberto’s removal hearing, which is the subject of this appeal, 
is discussed in more detail below.  In sum, the IJ was 
confrontational, dismissive, and hostile, interrupting and 
belittling Serrano-Alberto’s testimony, time and again cutting 
off his answers to questions, and nitpicking immaterial 
inconsistencies in his account.  The next day, she ordered his 
removal from the United States.  Serrano-Alberto appealed to 
the BIA, which twice rejected his entreaties, first affirming 
the IJ and then summarily denying Serrano-Alberto’s motion 
to reopen his case in a one-and-a-half page opinion.   
Serrano-Alberto now petitions this Court for review of 
both orders of the BIA, asserting, inter alia, that the BIA 
misapplied the law in rejecting his due process challenge to 
the IJ’s order of removal.  For the reasons that follow, we 
agree. 
II. Jurisdiction and Standard of Review 
 Although our jurisdiction is limited to final orders of 
the BIA under 8 U.S.C. § 1252, where the BIA affirms the IJ 
for the reasons set forth in his or her opinion, we review the 
                                              
2 Whether a social group constitutes a PSG, and is thus 
cognizable under the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA), 
see 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42)(A), is a continuously developing 
question of law and one that must be answered on a case-by-
case basis, see Valdiviezo-Galdamez v. Att’y Gen., 663 F.3d 
582, 594-609 (3d Cir. 2011).  Here, Serrano-Alberto 
identified his putative PSGs as soccer players perceived as 
wealthy and “professional soccer player[s] actively resisting 
gang control.”  Appellant’s Br. 36. 
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IJ’s decision directly.  Huang v. Att’y Gen., 620 F.3d 372, 379 
(3d Cir. 2010).  We will affirm findings of fact supported by 
substantial evidence and are bound by those findings “unless 
a reasonable adjudicator would be compelled to arrive at a 
contrary conclusion,” Camara, 580 F.3d at 201, while we 
exercise plenary review over legal determinations, including 
whether a petitioner’s due process rights have been violated, 
see Abdulrahman v. Ashcroft, 330 F.3d 587, 595-96 (3d Cir. 
2005).  By contrast, we review the denial of a motion to 
reopen for abuse of discretion and will reverse only if the 
denial was “arbitrary, irrational, or contrary to law.”  
Abulashvili v. Att’y Gen., 663 F.3d 197, 202 (3d Cir. 2011).   
III. Discussion 
 This appeal requires us to carefully examine the 
underlying administrative proceeding that gives rise to this 
appeal and to situate that proceeding in the landscape of our 
precedent governing due process in removal hearings.  
Below, we first address the legal standards governing due 
process claims and the grounds for relief from removal raised 
by Serrano-Alberto.  Next, we review in detail Serrano-
Alberto’s removal hearing and the process that led to his 
denial of relief.  And finally, we consider our due process 
cases to date and their implications for the removal 
proceedings in this case.   
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A.  Legal Standards Governing Serrano-
Alberto’s Due Process Claims and 
Underlying Claims for Relief 
 
Throughout all phases of deportation proceedings, 
petitioners must be afforded due process of law.  See Abdulai 
v. Ashcroft, 239 F.3d 542, 549 (3d Cir. 2001).  The Fifth 
Amendment thus guarantees aliens who are seeking to 
forestall or terminate removal proceedings an “opportunity to 
be heard at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner.”  
Dia v. Ashcroft, 353 F.3d 228, 239 (3d Cir. 2003) (en banc) 
(quoting Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 333 (1976)).  
This guarantee comprises three key protections: (1) 
“factfinding based on a record produced before the 
decisionmaker and disclosed to him or her”; (2) the 
opportunity to “make arguments on his or her own behalf”; 
and (3) “an individualized determination of his [or her] 
interests.”  Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).  In other 
words, petitioners must receive “a full and fair hearing that 
allows them a reasonable opportunity to present evidence on 
their behalf,” Abdulrahman, 330 F.3d at 596 (internal 
quotation marks omitted), and a decision on the merits of 
their claim by a “neutral and impartial arbiter,” Abulashvili, 
663 F.3d at 207.   
 
A petitioner claiming a procedural due process 
violation because he was not afforded the opportunity to 
argue on his own behalf is required to show “(1) that he was 
prevented from reasonably presenting his case[,] and (2) that 
substantial prejudice resulted.”  Fadiga v. Att’y Gen., 488 
F.3d 142, 155 (3d Cir. 2007) (internal quotation marks 
omitted).  The nature of this right is one that focuses on the 
fairness of the process itself, see Cham v. Att’y Gen., 445 
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F.3d 683, 691, 693 (3d Cir. 2006), and the substantial 
prejudice standard “is not so high” as to require a petitioner to 
prove he “would have qualified for asylum, withholding of 
removal or CAT relief” but for the alleged violation, id. at 
694.  Rather, a petitioner establishes a due process claim by 
showing that the infraction has “the potential for affecting the 
outcome of [the] deportation proceedings.”  Id. (quoting 
Shahandeh-Pey v. INS, 831 F.2d 1384, 1389 (7th Cir. 1987)) 
(alteration in original).   
 
Because the potential for affecting the outcome of any 
given deportation proceeding requires the court to consider 
the record in relation to the potential grounds asserted for 
relief, we briefly summarize the three grounds urged by 
Serrano-Alberto; asylum, withholding of removal, and 
eligibility for CAT protection, each of which carries different 
requirements.   
 
A petitioner seeking asylum must establish a well-
founded fear of future persecution in his home country “on 
account of race, religion, nationality, membership in a 
particular social group, or political opinion,” 8 U.S.C. 
§ 1101(a)(42)(A); see id. § 1158(b), by demonstrating a 
subjective fear that is objectively reasonable, Guo v. Ashcroft, 
386 F.3d 556, 564-65 (3d Cir. 2004).  While not sufficient on 
its own to establish eligibility for asylum, substantial 
evidence of past persecution “triggers a rebuttable 
presumption of a well-founded fear of future persecution, as 
long as that fear is related to the past persecution.”  Singh v. 
Gonzales, 406 F.3d 191, 195-96 (3d Cir. 2005). 
 
Although asylum is ultimately granted at the Attorney 
General’s discretion, withholding of removal, if established, 
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is mandatory.  Id. at 196.  An applicant must make the same 
showing as that required for asylum, but must meet a more 
stringent “clear probability” standard, “that is, that it is more 
likely than not that h[is] life or freedom would be threatened 
if returned to h[is] country” because of his membership in a 
statutorily protected class.  Kaita v. Att’y Gen., 522 F.3d 288, 
296 (3d Cir. 2008) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 
To qualify for protection under the CAT, a petitioner is 
required to demonstrate that “it is more likely than not that he 
. . . would be tortured” if returned to his country of origin.  Id. 
at 300.  Unlike asylum and withholding of removal, the 
petitioner’s protected status is irrelevant, but he must show 
that “severe pain or suffering” will likely be “inflicted by or 
at the instigation of or with the consent or acquiescence of a  
public official or other person acting in an official capacity.”  
Id. (quoting 8 C.F.R. § 208.18(a)(1)) (additional citation 
omitted).   
 
Following an adverse ruling with respect to any of 
these three grounds for relief, an applicant may appeal to the 
BIA, which reviews an IJ’s conclusions of law and 
discretionary exercise of authority de novo but accords 
deference to factual findings, reversing the latter only for 
clear error.  See Huang, 620 F.3d at 381.  Once removal 
proceedings have concluded, a petitioner may file a motion to 
reopen, which will be granted only in “compelling 
circumstances,” Shardar v. Att’y Gen., 503 F.3d 308, 313 (3d 
Cir. 2007), and will be denied if the BIA determines “(1) the 
alien has not established a prima facie case for the relief 
sought; (2) the alien has not introduced previously 
unavailable, material evidence; or (3) in the case of 
discretionary relief (such as asylum), the alien would not be 
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entitled to relief even if the motion was granted,” Huang, 620 
F.3d at 389 (internal quotation marks omitted).  With these 
standards in mind, we turn to the process that was afforded 
Serrano-Alberto.   
 
B. Serrano-Alberto’s Removal Proceedings 
Before the IJ and BIA 
Two patterns emerge from the record concerning 
Serrano-Alberto’s removal proceedings, spanning from his 
initial credible fear interview and application paperwork 
submitted to the Immigration Court to the actual removal 
hearing and denial of relief by the IJ and the BIA.  First, 
Serrano-Alberto consistently asserted facts in his submissions 
that on their face offered strong support for his claims for 
relief.  Second, at the hearing itself, his attempts to convey 
those facts were undercut by the IJ’s hostile and impatient 
attitude, repeated interruptions and castigations, constrictions 
on relevant responses, and inexplicable focus on irrelevant 
details.   
We begin our review of this record with the written 
materials assembled before the hearing and available for the 
IJ’s review.  These included Serrano-Alberto’s I-589 
application for relief, a DHS worksheet detailing his credible 
fear interview, documentary evidence submitted by Serrano-
Alberto, and additional agency records and a country report 
provided by the DHS.  In his I-589 application, Serrano-
Alberto sought asylum or withholding of removal based on 
his membership in an unspecified PSG, and he responded 
affirmatively when asked whether he, his family, or his close 
friends had ever experienced harm, mistreatment, or threats, 
explaining, “In 2008 they tried to kill me, they asked for 
money in exchange of my life and my family the gangs, 
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because I played futbol in the first division, . . . they I [sic] 
made a lot of money.”  AR 686.3  In answering whether he 
feared harm or mistreatment if returned to his home country, 
he stated, “[T]he gangs would kill me, because they keep 
trying to find me.  2 years ago they shot at me again 2 people 
on a motorcycle.  My little brother as well has gotten injured 
and was left on a wheel chair and my brother who is older 
they tried to kill days after.”  AR 686.  Additionally, with 
respect to whether he had ever been “accused, charged, 
arrested . . . or imprisoned in any country other than the 
United States,” he explained that he “was detained . . . and . . . 
investigated” in El Salvador, but eventually released and 
exonerated “because [he] did not have relation with the case.”  
AR 687.  Finally, Serrano-Alberto also expressed in his 
application a fear of “being subjected to torture” if returned to 
El Salvador because “the gang already tried to kill also my 
brother have been injured [sic] in my country the gang 
operate with a final of causing fear, death, torture, & 
extorture, kidnap at a . . . national level.”  AR 687.   
 
Serrano-Alberto’s credible fear worksheet offered 
similar insight into the factual grounds he alleged in support 
of his claims.  The DHS agent who interviewed Serrano-
Alberto after he was apprehended crossing the border found 
him to be fearful of persecution if returned to El Salvador, 
noting on the worksheet that Serrano-Alberto feared 
deportation “because the gangs will kill [him]”; that after 
Serrano-Alberto was shot six times in 2008—an incident 
reported in the news—“the police would not take [his] report, 
                                              
3 Throughout, we cite Serrano-Alberto’s Appendix 
(App.) whenever possible and the Administrative Record 
(AR) as necessary.   
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because [he] did not know the names of the people who shot 
[him]” and never asked him to describe what he witnessed 
that day; that Serrano-Alberto was the target of a shooting 
three years later because, he believed, he had witnessed the 
murder of his mother’s neighbor in 2008; and that Serrano-
Alberto did not believe he could relocate within El Salvador 
because the gang would be able to find him.  App. 172.  
Serrano-Alberto confirmed the accuracy of this account to the 
interviewing agent.   
 
Also contained in the written record was Serrano-
Alberto’s documentary evidence, which included newspaper 
articles regarding both his professional soccer career and the 
2008 shooting; affidavits attesting to his good character; 
records of his 2012 acquittal; and his brothers’ and his own 
medical records corroborating their bullet wounds from the 
shootings.  The documentary evidence also included materials 
submitted by the DHS, such as Serrano-Alberto’s initial 
detainment records, and a U.S. Department of State country 
report on human rights practices in El Salvador.   
 
While the written materials in the record provided 
significant support for granting Serrano-Alberto relief, 
Serrano-Alberto was far less successful in his efforts to 
communicate the basis for his claims at the removal hearing 
itself.  That hearing took place in February 2015, before IJ 
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Mirlande Tadal in Elizabeth, New Jersey.4  Serrano-Alberto, 
at that point, was proceeding pro se and participating 
remotely by videoconference from the detention facility 
where he was housed.  In addition to the IJ and Serrano-
Alberto, a Spanish interpreter and a DHS representative were 
present.   
 
From the outset, the IJ took an argumentative tone and 
expressed exasperation.  Her first exchange with Serrano-
Alberto was a contentious one, precipitated by Serrano-
                                              
4 The Government produced the audio recording of this 
hearing on the Court’s request, although it urged that the 
recording not be considered because the BIA was not 
obligated to listen to it and Serrano-Alberto failed to request 
that it be included in the record before the BIA.  See generally 
8 C.F.R. § 1003.5(a) (requiring that the record from the 
Immigration Court be forwarded to the BIA on appeal and 
directing the expeditious transcription of all relevant 
proceedings); Executive Office of Immigration Review, 
Immigration Court Practice Manual at 68 (Apr. 11, 2017), 
https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/pages/attachments/
2016/12/02/practice_manual.pdf (“If an Immigration Judge’s 
decision is appealed to the [BIA], the hearing is transcribed in 
appropriate cases and a transcript is sent to both parties.”).  
Although we note that, whether on its own initiative or upon 
request of counsel, the BIA’s review of such recordings could 
more fully inform its evaluation of a due process claim and 
facilitate appellate review, we agree with the Government that 
where, as here, it is not apparent the audio recording was 
made part of the record before the BIA, we will not consider 
it part of the record on appeal.  We therefore do not rely on 
the recording for purposes of this opinion. 
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Alberto’s misunderstanding of a question she asked regarding 
his I-589 application.  Specifically, after confirming a packet 
of documentary evidence she received prior to the hearing 
was indeed submitted by Serrano-Alberto, the IJ asked 
whether he wished to make any corrections to his application, 
and he responded by attempting to verify the packet included 
a letter he had submitted from one of his brothers.  The IJ 
reacted by immediately admonishing him to “[P]lease answer 
my questions.  I am having problems today.  No one wants to 
answer my questions.”  App. 26.   
Resuming her questioning, the IJ then asked where in 
El Salvador Serrano-Alberto resided when he fled the country 
and how long he had lived there.  When Serrano-Alberto 
proved unable to answer with a single residence and fixed 
time period because of his frequent moves to avoid detection 
by the gang, the IJ quickly became frustrated, stating on the 
record: “Okay, let’s start again, sir.  Please listen to the 
question.  If you did not understand it, ask.  I will repeat it.  
Ask me to repeat the question.”  App. 31.  The second time 
around, Serrano-Alberto again attempted to explain his moves 
and why he could not provide precise dates, testifying: “Well, 
as I said before, I didn’t live there [in Residencial La Gloria] 
for too long because I had to change my place of residence.  I 
had to go from one place to another.”  App. 31-32.  The IJ 
then interrupted even before the interpreter had the 
opportunity to translate Serrano-Alberto’s next answer into 
English: “No, no, excuse me.  All right, I understood that part 
of Spanish.  You refuse to answer my question.  You may 
have lived in other places -- . . . provide me with the year, the 
month and year you began living there until, a month and 
year and then after that you’ll be able to tell me after you left, 
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you left this place you went to live to [sic] another place.  All 
right, sir?”  App. 32.   
The tenor of the hearing only deteriorated from there.  
In addition to maintaining her hostile tone, the IJ interrupted 
Serrano-Alberto’s testimony on multiple occasions and 
directed him to provide only “yes or no” answers to her 
questions, effectively precluding Serrano-Alberto from 
making his case.  App. 37-38, 48.  For example, during 
Serrano-Alberto’s testimony regarding the police response to 
the 2008 shooting, the IJ’s interjections repeatedly prevented 
Serrano-Alberto from presenting evidence critical to the 
element of government acquiescence in Serrano-Alberto’s 
claim for protection under the CAT.  First, the IJ asked 
whether Serrano-Alberto was able to provide the police with 
the names of the shooters, as they had requested, and Serrano-
Alberto replied, “To me, it was not so easy because it is very 
hard to give information to the police in my country.”  App. 
37.  Failing to recognize the significance of this assertion, the 
IJ instead simply repeated her question, asking, “Did you 
provide, did you provide, when the police made this inquiry, 
did you provide information to the police?  Yes or no, sir.”  
App. 37.  When Serrano-Alberto responded, “I didn’t do it 
because they said they were going to come back and they 
didn’t,” App. 37, the IJ retorted, “No, when they asked you 
the information that day, sir, they asked you if you knew the 
name, the nickname, of those who may have assaulted you or 
shot at you.  Did you give the police information right there 
and then?  It was a simple question.  Yes or no?  Yes or no,” 
App. 37.  And when Serrano-Alberto explained that he “did 
not know who the[] [shooters] were” and he “could not 
identify them directly,” the IJ reprimanded: “Sir, please listen 
to me.  Just answer the question.  You have a habit of not 
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answering the question.  All right, we’re going to be here all 
afternoon if you don’t answer the question.  All right, did you 
know who these people were, sir, yes or no?”  App. 37-38.  
Serrano-Alberto tried one more time, saying, “I just know that 
they were gang members.”  App. 38.  Again the IJ interjected: 
“When the police asked you to identify them, were you able 
to identify them to the police, yes or no?”  App. 38.  Serrano-
Alberto finally replied, “No.”  App. 38.   
 
The IJ’s interference with Serrano-Alberto’s 
presentation of his case was further exacerbated by the IJ’s 
surprising lack of familiarity with the record at the hearing.  
For example, she incorrectly believed Serrano-Alberto had 
been convicted of extortion in El Salvador, apparently having 
overlooked the evidence he submitted of his acquittal.  
Additionally, she was unaware of Serrano-Alberto’s career as 
a professional soccer player, going so far as to chide him for 
identifying his occupation as “playing football” and rejoining, 
“Did you work, sir?  Please answer my question.  We’ll get to 
everything, sir.  Did you work in El Salvador?”  App. 33.   
 
In another instance, although the written record before 
the IJ disclosed that the reason Serrano-Alberto fled to the 
United States was that he believed gang members would find 
him in his last place of residence, La Gloria, the IJ 
repetitiously asked only whether he “ha[d] any problems in 
La Gloria.”  App. 48.  Frustrated by his answers that: “I didn’t 
have any problems there because I didn’t spend a lot of time 
there,” and, “Well, I always found a way not to spend too 
much time where I lived,” App. 48, the IJ interposed, “I’ll ask 
the question again for the third time.  Did you experience any 
problems in La Gloria?  Yes or no,” App. 48.  At that point, 
Serrano-Alberto replied, “Directly, no, I didn’t have any 
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problems, but, yes, they were looking for me.”  App. 48.  
Even then, when Serrano-Alberto tried to explain that his 
family members in other parts of the country had been 
approached by gang members who were looking for him 
during the time he was living in La Gloria, the IJ remained 
tightly focused on the fact that he had no direct, face-to-face 
contact with gang members in that location, stating, “Let’s 
focus on your situation, sir.  You claim that gang members 
were looking for you.  How did you . . . come to the 
conclusion that gang members were looking for you while 
you were in La Gloria?”  App. 48.  When Serrano-Alberto 
again described the warnings he had received from family 
members living elsewhere in El Salvador that the gangs were 
attempting to locate him, instead of inquiring further about 
these warnings, the IJ asked, “Did you have any direct contact 
with gang members in La Gloria, sir?  Did you have face to 
face contact with them?”  App. 49.  Serrano-Alberto replied 
that, other than observing “suspicious things going on” such 
as an “unknown car driving around” his neighborhood, he had 
not had face-to-face contact with gang members.  App. 49.  
The IJ then moved on.   
At the same time the IJ curtailed Serrano-Alberto’s 
ability to explain himself or finish his answers, she repeatedly 
steered Serrano-Alberto away from matters directly relevant 
to his eligibility for relief, focusing instead on inconsequential 
details and inconsistencies that were easily reconcilable with 
Serrano-Alberto’s narrative.  For example, when Serrano-
Alberto explained that the reason he was shot in 2008 was 
that he had refused to make any additional payments to the 
gang—payments demanded “in exchange of not killing [him 
or his] family,” App. 42—the IJ, instead of eliciting further 
testimony on this point, chastised Serrano-Alberto for 
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confusing the frequency and exact dates of his prior payments 
to the gang.  Even though he was able to recall making 
approximately six payments “between September and 
November of 2008,” App. 42, his inability to provide the 
exact date and amount of each payment prompted the IJ to 
retort: “[W]hen I ask you a question, sir, there is a reason why 
the question was asked.  When you answer my question, I 
listen to you, sir, and . . . your answers are being recorded.  
All right.  So, we are listening to you sir.  I am listening.  I’m 
paying attention to every word that you say, sir.”  App. 42-43.   
In another example, Serrano-Alberto attempted to 
describe the corrupt affiliation between the police and the 
gangs, testifying in response to questioning by DHS counsel 
that if he had reached out to the police after being released 
from the hospital, the gang would have “go[ne] directly to my 
house and kill[ed] me,” App. 52.  The IJ, however, 
spontaneously changed the topic and began berating Serrano-
Alberto for submitting, without more explanation, his 
brother’s medical records, i.e., those records corroborating the 
brother’s shooting by gang members in 2007.  When Serrano-
Alberto then attempted to explain the significance of the 
records, the IJ cut him off, stating dismissively: “It does not 
provide the cause of the injury, sir. . . .  I’ll move on.”  App. 
53.   
At another point, after Serrano-Alberto recounted the 
2008 incident where he was shot and hospitalized—testimony 
that he corroborated with the submission of his own medical 
records—the IJ, instead of inquiring about the shooting, 
honed in on the exact length of Serrano-Alberto’s inpatient, 
as opposed to outpatient, hospital treatment—a detail of no 
particular relevance to his claims.  Although Serrano-Alberto 
first tried to explain, “I couldn’t tell you how many days 
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because I was several days under anesthesia because of my 
wounds and the pain,” the IJ continued aggressively, “So you 
were discharged from the hospital when?  A week?  Two 
weeks?  A month?  Three months?  A year,” App. 36, and 
Serrano-Alberto eventually acquiesced in providing an 
estimate of “[a]pproximately a month,” App. 36—placing his 
release in January of 2009.   
Later in the hearing, however, the IJ again took up the 
issue when she noticed that the medical records Serrano-
Alberto submitted reflected a discharge date of December 7, 
2008, with “reference to outpatient for follow-up.”  AR 655.  
Accusing Serrano-Alberto of intentionally misrepresenting 
the length of his inpatient treatment, the IJ charged: “You 
testified, sir, that you were admitted at the hospital for a 
month.  You submitted a document, sir, according to this 
document you were admitted . . . . less than what, nine days? 
. . . .  And after that you were an outpatient.  Is this correct?”  
App. 55.  Serrano-Alberto agreed, but attempted to explain 
his continued hospital care (presumably as an outpatient) 
because “[w]hat happened was they made me walk and my 
wounds bled.”  App. 55.  Incredulous, the IJ rejoined: “That 
wasn’t the, you didn’t answer the question, sir. . . .  So which 
is correct, your testimony that you were discharged in early 
January 2009 or your submission, the written document that 
you were discharged on December 7, 2008?  One is correct 
and one is not correct.  Which one is correct and which one is 
not correct?  There’s no gray area.  Which one is correct?”  
App. 55.  Serrano-Alberto replied, “With all due respect, I 
made a mistake.  The document is correct.”  App. 55.  The IJ 
promptly announced she was finished with her questioning 
and asked Serrano-Alberto whether he wished to add 
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anything else.  Not surprisingly after this browbeating, he 
responded “[n]o.”  App. 55.   
 The day after the hearing, the IJ issued an oral decision 
denying Serrano-Alberto’s application for relief and ordering 
his removal to El Salvador.  Although Serrano-Alberto’s 
testimony was presumptively credible as the IJ rendered no 
adverse findings to the contrary, see 8 U.S.C. 
§ 1158(b)(1)(B)(iii); Camara, 580 F.3d at 201, she found 
“there is no objective evidence whatsoever that the gang 
members were targeting him due to his refusal to pay the 
rent,” App. 18.  Based on that finding and her observation 
that the shooters from 2008 and 2012 themselves “did not 
give him any indication as to why they were shooting at him,” 
App. 18, the IJ concluded that Serrano-Alberto’s fear of 
persecution was not objectively reasonable.  The IJ also held, 
with respect to asylum and withholding of removal, that 
Serrano-Alberto did not meet his burden of establishing “that 
individuals perceived as wealthy who refuse to pay gang 
taxes” constitute a PSG eligible for protection under the INA, 
App. 17, or that there was a nexus between his membership in 
any PSG and his fear of persecution.  As for CAT protection, 
the IJ determined Serrano-Alberto failed to show that the 
Salvadoran government would consent or acquiesce if a gang 
attacked him, finding—again, despite Serrano-Alberto’s 
presumptively credible testimony—that the police “repeatedly 
attempted to investigate the 2008 shooting.”  App. 20. 
After retaining counsel, Serrano-Alberto timely 
appealed to the BIA, contesting the IJ’s rulings and arguing 
the IJ violated his right to due process.  The BIA adopted and 
affirmed the IJ’s decision, dismissing the appeal.  In its 
opinion, the BIA assumed, without deciding, that Serrano-
Alberto had established membership in a PSG and/or had 
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established an imputed anti-gang political opinion, but held 
that he failed to demonstrate the required nexus—that is, that 
any protected ground was a central reason for the harm he 
experienced.5  With respect to persecution, the BIA noted, 
                                              
5 In a number of recent cases, the BIA likewise has 
assumed a cognizable PSG or imputed political opinion and 
disposed of the appeal by finding no nexus.  See, e.g., Bol-
Velasquez v. Att’y Gen., No. 15-3098 (3d Cir. filed Aug. 28, 
2015) (ECF Agency Case Docketed); Bell v. Att’y Gen., No. 
14-4781 (3d Cir. filed Dec. 18, 2014) (same); Santos v. Att’y 
Gen., No. 14-1050 (3d Cir. filed Jan. 8, 2014) (same); Ulloa-
Santos v. Att’y Gen., No. 12-2781 (3d Cir. filed June 25, 
2012) (same); Orellana-Garcia v. Att’y Gen., No. 12-2099 
(3d Cir. filed Apr. 20, 2012) (same).  This practice, however, 
can have troubling consequences.  First, it places the 
analytical cart before the horse in cases like this one, where 
the very definition of the PSG is then at issue, for denying 
relief based on the absence of a nexus begs the question: 
nexus to what?  See, e.g., Bol-Velasquez, No. 15-3098.  Even 
the Attorney General has observed “it would be better 
practice for Immigration Judges and the Board to address at 
the outset whether the applicant has established persecution 
on account of membership in a [PSG], rather than assuming it 
as the Board did here.  Deciding that issue—and defining the 
[PSG] of which the applicant is a part—is fundamental to the 
analysis of which party bears the burden of proof and what 
the nature of that burden is.”  Matter of A-T-, 24 I. & N. Dec. 
617, 623 n.7 (U.S. Att’y Gen. 2008).  Second, even where the 
PSG definition is undisputed—so that the BIA would 
certainly have discretion to conclude that the efficiency of 
assuming a given PSG weighs in favor of resolution at the 
nexus stage—a reflexive practice of simply assuming a PSG 
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first, that it was unclear whether Serrano-Alberto was targeted 
in the 2008 and 2012 shootings, and second, that Serrano-
Alberto lived in El Salvador unharmed between 2012 and 
2014, undermining the potential relevance of any earlier 
                                                                                                     
has been established and is cognizable does not account for 
the very real benefits on the other side of the scale.  Just as 
the Supreme Court has observed in the qualified immunity 
context, adjudication at every step is generally “necessary to 
support the Constitution’s ‘elaboration from case to case’ and 
to prevent constitutional stagnation” because “[t]he law might 
be deprived of this explanation were a court simply to skip 
ahead,” Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 232, 236 (2009) 
(holding the two-step protocol announced in Saucier v. Katz, 
533 U.S. 194 (2001) is no longer mandatory “but often 
beneficial”), so here, the BIA’s practice of assuming PSG and 
resolving cases on nexus grounds often inhibits the proper 
and orderly development of the law in this area by leaving the 
contours of protected status undefined, precluding further 
appellate review under the Chenery doctrine, see SEC v. 
Chenery Corp., 332 U.S. 194 (1947), and ultimately 
generating additional needless litigation because of the 
uncertainty in this area, see Valdiviezo-Galdamez, 663 F.3d at 
594-609; Fatin v. INS, 12 F.3d 1233, 1238 (3d Cir. 1993); 
Matter of M-E-V-G-, 26 I. & N. Dec. 227, 230 (BIA 2014).  
This is a case in point, where the IJ articulated the relevant 
PSG as “individuals perceived as wealthy who refuse to pay 
gang taxes,” App. 17, although other definitions were 
reasonable, and the BIA, despite being presented with 
alternative formulations, declined to rule on the question 
altogether.  In sum, for both of the reasons stated, we strongly 
encourage IJs and the BIA to define the PSG in question and 
to adjudicate the existence and cognizability of that PSG.   
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events.  Finally, the BIA summarily affirmed the IJ’s decision 
on CAT protection and “disagree[d] with” Serrano-Alberto’s 
contention that the IJ did not fully develop the record, 
asserting that the IJ had considered the entire record and had 
provided Serrano-Alberto with a reasonable opportunity to 
present testimony, documents, and arguments, and finding 
“no indication that the actions of the [IJ] amount[ed] to a 
violation of due process.”  App. 13.   
The BIA also denied Serrano-Alberto’s subsequent 
motion to reopen.  That motion reiterated his due process 
allegations, and highlighted additional evidence and 
testimony that he contended he would have offered if given a 
fair opportunity.  For example, Serrano-Alberto offered sworn 
statements in the accompanying affidavit that when the gang 
members called him to collect rent, they “said they knew who 
I was because I was a soccer player, and they could track my 
movements by looking in the paper or the radio, so they 
would easily know where I was going to be playing. . . . I was 
afraid, because I knew other soccer players had been 
killed,”—statements suggesting that Serrano-Alberto’s 
position as a soccer player placed him prominently on the 
gangs’ radar and thus supporting his claim of membership in 
a PSG.  App. 70.  With respect to the gang’s asserted reason 
for targeting him, Serrano-Alberto explained that his “soccer 
organization was explicitly opposed to gangs,” and that he 
“would talk to the young men in [his] neighborhood about 
how they could play soccer too, and then they wouldn’t need 
to be involved in any bad activities.”  App. 69.  And finally, 
relevant to his claim for protection under the CAT, Serrano-
Alberto attested to having “problems with the police,” 
explaining that they often harassed and searched him, that in 
2009 they “were threatening [him],” and that sometimes they 
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would stop him and “push [him] up against the wall, or hit or 
kick [him].”  App. 71.  He described one incident where 
officers hit him in the chest, held his head up so they could 
take a picture of him, laughed and made fun of his soccer 
team, made sarcastic comments, and used vulgar language 
before releasing him.  App. 71.   
 C. Serrano-Alberto’s Due Process Claim 
 Serrano-Alberto now argues to this Court, as he did 
before the BIA on direct appeal and in his motion to reopen, 
that the IJ’s conduct of the removal hearing violated his right 
to procedural due process.6   
While in the vast majority of cases, IJs diligently 
comport with their constitutional and statutory obligations, 
and while it is only on rare occasion that we have held an IJ’s 
conduct crosses the line, the record here compels us to 
conclude this is one of those rare cases.  Because we reach 
this conclusion against the backdrop of the three main cases 
to date in which we have distinguished between permissible 
                                              
6 Serrano-Alberto also argued on appeal that the new 
evidence he presented in support of his motion to reopen 
could not have been presented previously, that this evidence 
demonstrates he was prejudiced by the due process violations 
at his removal hearing, that his expert testimony submitted in 
support of reopening makes a prima facie showing of his 
eligibility for relief, that he can establish persecution based on 
political opinion or membership in a PSG, and that the BIA 
failed to address Serrano-Alberto’s eligibility for CAT 
protection in its opinion denying his motion to reopen.  For 
the reasons set forth below, we need not reach these claims.  
See infra n.9. 
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and impermissible IJ conduct under the Due Process Clause, 
we will review each of those cases before addressing Serrano-
Alberto’s claims for relief. 
First, in Wang v. Attorney General, 423 F.3d 260 (3d 
Cir. 2005), we held the petitioner did not receive due process 
where the IJ employed a disparaging and sarcastic tone 
throughout the petitioner’s removal hearing and expressed 
great disapproval of aspects of the petitioner’s personal life 
that were irrelevant to his claims, id. at 263-65.  Among other 
things, the IJ repeatedly badgered the petitioner for paying a 
smuggler to help him abscond from China to the United 
States and pointed out that the petitioner had hired an 
immigration attorney and wore a suit and tie to court, 
assuming for these reasons that the petitioner must have 
significant financial resources.  Id. at 263-64.  The IJ also 
berated him for failing to pay a penalty levied against his 
parents in China for his wife’s illegal second child, despite no 
evidence in the record that the petitioner had sufficient funds 
to do so at his disposal, id. at 263, and inexplicably chastised 
the petitioner in a derisive tone on the extent of his 
commitment to his disabled daughter in China, stating, for 
example, “Have you ever had medical records about your 
darling first child Ming Wang brought to the United States of 
America?  Yes or no. . . . Well why don’t you have any 
medical records here to prove to me that you care enough 
about your daughter to have asked the doctor here about her 
welfare?”  Id. at 264.   
Based on such comments, we concluded that the IJ’s 
conduct in that case evinced bias against the petitioner, id. at 
269-71, that “many of the issues addressed by the IJ at length 
. . . were irrelevant to” the petitioner’s claims for relief, id. at 
269, and that “[w]hile the IJ explicitly deemed her broad 
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character judgments relevant to her decision, they were not,” 
id. at 270.  We therefore granted the petition for review, 
explaining that the IJ’s opinion was grossly insufficient to 
support her adverse credibility finding and that her “conduct 
so tainted the proceedings below that we [could not] be 
confident that [the petitioner] was afforded the opportunity 
fully to develop the factual predicates of his claim.”  Id. at 
271.  We also expressed our “sore[] disappoint[ment] that the 
IJ . . . chose to attack [the petitioner’s] moral character rather 
than conduct a fair and impartial inquiry into his asylum 
claims,” and we described “[t]he tone, the tenor, the 
disparagement, and the sarcasm of the IJ” as “more 
appropriate to a court television show than a federal court 
proceeding.”  Id. at 269.   
Similarly, one year later, in Cham v. Attorney General, 
445 F.3d 683 (3d Cir. 2006), we held due process was 
violated by an IJ who “continually abused an increasingly 
distraught petitioner, . . . wholesale nitpick[ed] . . . with an 
eye towards finding inconsistencies and contradictions,” and 
denied that petitioner the opportunity to present testimony 
from critical witnesses who were only available on dates after 
the hearing, id. at 691-93.  The numerous belligerent 
statements by the IJ included: “I don’t want you speaking 
English.  I gave you the opportunity and you flubbed the 
opportunity.  You were tripping all over the words in English.  
Your English is not that good . . . . You’re just delaying 
everything here. . . . Would you stop with the sorry.  Just give 
me an answer. . . . Now, you better come up with an answer 
pretty quickly or I’ll find that you’re non-responsive.”  Id. at 
688.  After reviewing the record, we concluded the IJ’s 
hostility infected the hearing and vitiated his adverse 
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credibility determination, and we vacated and remanded for 
rehearing.  Id. at 694.   
Although the Government in Cham contended that, 
regardless of the IJ’s conduct, the petitioner’s application did 
not merit relief, we explained, “The issue here . . . ‘is not 
whether the evidence as it stands supports the result reached 
by the immigration judge and the BIA,’ but instead ‘is 
whether the original deportation hearing was conducted in a 
fair enough fashion for one to determine that the BIA’s 
decision was based on reasonable, substantial, and probative 
evidence.’”  Id. at 693 (quoting Podio v. INS, 153 F.3d 506, 
509 (7th Cir. 1998)).  It was sufficient, we explained, that the 
IJ’s conduct “had the potential for affecting the outcome” of 
the proceedings, id. at 694 (quoting Shahandeh-Pey, 831 F.2d 
at 1389), and we concluded the “brow beaten” petitioner, 
verbally abused and deprived of the opportunity to present 
testimony essential to his case, deserved “a second, and a real, 
chance to create a record in a deportation hearing that 
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comports with the requirements of due process,” id. (internal 
quotation marks omitted).7 
In contrast, in Abdulrahman v. Ashcroft, 330 F.3d 587 
(3d Cir. 2003), although we acknowledged “the language 
                                              
7 In at least three additional cases, we determined the 
IJ’s adverse credibility findings to be unsupported by 
substantial evidence, remanding for rehearing and urging the 
reassignment of a different IJ.  See Sukwanputra v. Gonzales, 
434 F.3d 627, 637-38 (3d Cir. 2006); Shah v. Att’y Gen., 446 
F.3d 429, 430, 437 (3d Cir. 2006); Fiadjoe v. Att’y Gen., 411 
F.3d 135, 155, 163 (3d Cir. 2005).  Although not decided on 
constitutional grounds, the due process implications in each 
case are obvious and noteworthy.  See Sukwanputra, 434 F.3d 
at 638 (“[E]ven if the IJ was not actually biased—and we do 
not speculate here as to h[is] state of mind—the mere 
appearance of bias on h[is] part could still diminish the 
stature of the judicial process []he represents.  As stated by 
the Supreme Court, ‘justice must satisfy the appearance of 
justice.’” (quoting Offutt v. United States, 348 U.S. 11, 13 
(1954)) (additional internal citation and quotations marks 
omitted)); Shah, 446 F.3d at 437 (“Although we don’t expect 
an Immigration Judge to search for ways to sustain an alien’s 
testimony, neither do we expect the judge to search for ways 
to undermine and belittle it.” (quoting Zhang v. Gonzales, 406 
F.3d 150, 158 (3d Cir. 2005) (McKee, J., concurring)); 
Fiadjoe, 411 F.3d at 155 (“The conduct of the IJ by itself 
would require a rejection of his credibility finding.”); see also 
Myrie v. Att’y Gen., 855 F.3d 509, 511, 518 (3d Cir. 2017) 
(remanding on alternative grounds but expressing due process 
concerns with the IJ’s conduct and urging reassignment on 
remand).   
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used by the IJ during the hearing and in her opinion [did] 
reflect an annoyance and dissatisfaction with [the petitioner’s] 
testimony that [was] far from commendable,” we held that 
this palpable “lack of courtesy” did not, without more, violate 
his due process rights, id. at 597.  Critical to our conclusion 
was our determination that the IJ “did not obstruct or 
denigrate [the petitioner’s] . . . testimony” and “interjected 
only to allow [the petitioner] to clarify inconsistent responses 
or to give him the opportunity to respond in further detail.”  
Id.  Even though “her commentary was not confined to the 
evidence in the record and smacked of impermissible 
conjecture,” id. at 598, we determined the IJ’s findings and 
credibility determination were “supported by substantial 
evidence,” and thus her conclusions were “reasonable,” id. at 
599.   
What these cases teach us is that, where a petitioner 
claims to have been deprived of the opportunity to “make 
arguments on his or her own behalf,” Dia, 353 F.3d at 239, 
there is a spectrum of troubling conduct that is fact-specific 
and must be evaluated on a case-by-case basis to determine if 
(1) the petitioner “was prevented from reasonably presenting 
his case[,] and (2) . . . substantial prejudice resulted,” Fadiga, 
488 F.3d at 155 (internal quotation marks omitted).  At one 
end of the spectrum, the “lack of courtesy,” “interject[ions]” 
to clarify and develop the record, and “annoyance and 
dissatisfaction with . . . testimony” in Abdulrahman, 330 F.3d 
at 597, were not sufficient to establish a due process claim.  
At the other end, the “contemptuous tone,” focus on “issues 
irrelevant to” the petitioner’s claims, and findings 
unsupported by the record in Wang, 423 F.3d at 270, and the 
“wholesale nitpicking,” “continual[] abuse[]” and 
“belligerence,” and “interrupt[ions] . . . preventing important 
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parts of [the petitioner’s] story from becoming a part of the 
record,” in Cham, 445 F.3d at 691, 694, were flagrant enough 
to violate due process.  Where these component parts of an 
IJ’s conduct are sufficiently egregious, at least in 
combination, a petitioner’s procedural due process rights are 
violated.   
In Serrano-Alberto’s case, we conclude the IJ’s 
conduct falls on the impermissible end of the spectrum.  
Indeed, the IJ’s conduct here shares many of the attributes of 
the conduct we found unconstitutional in Wang and Cham, 
including a hostile and demeaning tone, a focus on issues 
irrelevant to the merits, brow beating, and continual 
interruptions.  See supra Sec. III.B.  And in contrast to 
Abdulrahman where the interruptions assisted the petitioner 
in answering questions and appropriately refocused the 
hearing, 330 F.3d at 596-98, the IJ’s interruptions here 
repeatedly shut down productive questioning and focused 
instead on irrelevant details, see supra Sec. III.B.   
Also in contrast to Abdulrahman, the IJ’s most critical 
findings and conclusions were not “reasonable” and 
“supported by substantial evidence,” 330 F.3d at 599, but 
rather were directly contradicted by the record and otherwise 
inexplicable.  Serrano-Alberto had testified that he was shot 
in 2008 shortly after refusing to continue making rent 
payments to the gang (corroborated by medical records, AR 
655, 663), that “when I was detained, the gang members 
found [my brother] to ask him about me . . . . [telling] him 
that if they couldn’t find me, that they were going to kill him 
and so they shot him and almost took his life,” App. 53 
(testimony also corroborated by medical records, AR 614-15), 
that he was the sole target of another shooting in 2012—
immediately after he was released from prison, and that “my 
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mother and my brother told me that [gang members] were 
asking for me [in 2013] . . . . and . . . they were going to find 
me because their intention was to kill me,” App. 46.  Yet, the 
IJ, without making any adverse credibility determination, 
found that “nothing in the record suggests that [Serrano-
Alberto] was the intended victim of the 2008 shooting . . . . 
[and] [t]he 2012 attack is similar,” App. 18, and, remarkably, 
rested her conclusion that Serrano-Alberto’s fear of 
persecution was not objectively reasonable on her observation 
that the drive-by shooters in 2008 and 2012 did not stop to 
tell him the reason “why they were shooting at him,” App. 18.  
Just as remarkably, the BIA summarily stated: “The 
Immigration Judge correctly noted that the respondent has not 
shown that gang members or any other individuals or groups 
have any interest in him, or that he was the intended target in 
2008 or 2012.”  App. 12.   
Likewise, despite Serrano-Alberto’s testimony, “I 
couldn’t [report the 2008 shooting] because the police is 
associated with the gang . . . . If I went and reported them, I 
knew that they will go directly to my house and kill me,” 
App. 51-52, and his sworn statement in his credible fear 
interview that police officers give information to gangs, App. 
170, the IJ found that “[t]his record . . . does not establish that 
the . . . government would exercise willful blindness with 
respect to any hypothetical torture respondent might 
experience,” App. 20, and the BIA simply “agree[d] with the 
Immigration Judge’s conclusion that the respondent did not 
meet his burden to establish eligibility for protection under 
the CAT,” App. 13. 
All told, although the IJ neither denied a request from 
Serrano-Alberto to submit evidence, as in Cham, 445 F.3d at 
691-93, nor belittled him for his life choices, as in Wang, 423 
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F.3d 263-65, the pervasiveness and egregiousness of the other 
problematic conduct here—the IJ’s interrupting and cabining 
Serrano-Alberto to “yes or no” answers during critical 
testimony, honing in on various and sundry irrelevant details, 
making findings contradicted by the record, and maintaining a 
condescending and belligerent tone throughout the hearing, 
see supra Sec. III.B—evinced bias and created an intolerable 
atmosphere of intimidation.  Combined with the IJ’s lack of 
familiarity with the written record and failure to develop the 
record,8 the IJ’s conduct deprived Serrano-Alberto of “a full 
and fair hearing [with] . . . a reasonable opportunity to present 
evidence on [his] behalf,” Abdulrahman, 330 F.3d at 596 
                                              
8 To be clear, we do not hold today that due process 
imposes on an IJ an affirmative obligation to develop the 
record or to gain a particular level of familiarity with a 
petitioner’s case before presiding over her hearing.  Like the 
Second Circuit, which has recognized the relevance of failure 
to develop the record to determining whether substantial 
evidence supports an IJ’s decision, see Yang v. McElroy, 277 
F.3d 158, 162 (2d Cir. 2002), we have held previously that 
failure to develop the record is a relevant consideration in 
such circumstances as evaluating whether an IJ’s adverse 
credibility determination is supported by substantial evidence, 
see Senathirajah v. I.N.S., 157 F.3d 210, 220 (3d Cir. 1998), 
or whether the IJ has given the petitioner a fair opportunity to 
provide corroborating documentation, see Toure v. Att’y Gen., 
443 F.3d 310, 325 (3d Cir. 2006).  Although the Eighth and 
Ninth Circuits have suggested that an IJ may be 
constitutionally obligated to develop the record under the Due 
Process Clause, see Al Khouri v. Ashcroft, 362 F.3d 461, 465 
(8th Cir. 2004); Agyeman v. I.N.S., 296 F.3d 871, 877 (9th 
Cir. 2002), we have not so held and do not go so far today. 
Case: 16-1586     Document: 003112648221     Page: 33      Date Filed: 06/12/2017
34 
 
(internal quotation marks omitted), and most certainly had 
“the potential for affecting the outcome of [the] deportation 
proceedings,” Cham, 445 F.3d at 694 (quoting Shahandeh-
Pey, 831 F.2d at 1389).  In short, as in Cham and Wang, the 
IJ’s conduct here “so tainted the proceedings below that we 
cannot be confident that [Serrano-Alberto] was afforded the 
opportunity fully to develop the factual predicates of his 
claim,” Wang, 423 F.3d at 271; see Cham, 445 F.3d at 694.   
Strikingly, the Government, instead of engaging 
Serrano-Alberto’s due process argument, dedicated a mere 
two pages of its brief to the issue.  And while the Government 
acknowledged at oral argument that there were instances 
“where the Immigration Judge stop[ped] him short when he 
[was] beginning to answer a question,” Oral Arg. 39:36-41, it 
attempted to explain those instances away as “something 
getting lost in translation or something not necessarily being 
understood the first time around,” Oral Arg. 39:47-52, 
arguing that “the fact that she became frustrated or a little bit 
annoyed that she wasn’t getting direct answers from the 
petitioner isn’t reason in and of itself to send this case back as 
a result of a due process violation,” Oral Arg. 40:14-27.  That 
explanation falls flat given the nature, number, and effect of 
the IJ’s interruptions.  See supra Sec. III.B. 
We are also unmoved by the Government’s suggestion 
that any errors by the IJ were cured because Serrano-Alberto 
“had an opportunity to file a motion to reopen to submit all 
this additional evidence.”  Oral Arg. 40:35-39.  That 
argument is precisely the one we rejected in Cham, where we 
explained “[t]he issue . . . ‘is not whether the evidence as it 
stands supports the result reached by the immigration judge 
and the BIA,’ but instead ‘is whether the original deportation 
hearing was conducted in a fair enough fashion for one to 
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determine that the BIA’s decision was based on reasonable, 
substantial, and probative evidence.’”  445 F.3d at 693 
(quoting Podio, 153 F.3d at 509).9   
In sum, we have no occasion to address the merits of 
Serrano-Alberto’s application for asylum, withholding of 
removal, and CAT protection because we conclude Serrano-
Alberto is entitled to present his case anew and will grant his 
petition for review.  We also urge the BIA, upon its further 
remand, to reassign this matter to a new IJ.  As the BIA itself 
has recognized, “Conduct by an Immigration Judge that can 
be perceived as bullying or hostile can have a chilling effect 
                                              
9 Indeed, if anything, Serrano-Alberto’s motion to 
reopen before the BIA would appear to reinforce the 
conclusion that the IJ’s interference in Serrano-Alberto’s 
presentation of his case had “the potential for affecting the 
outcome of [the] deportation proceedings,” Cham, 445 F.3d at 
694 (quoting Shahandeh-Pey, 831 F.2d at 1389), in view of 
the proof it proffered in support of Serrano-Alberto’s claims 
for relief, see, e.g., App. 69-71.  Given our disposition of 
Serrano-Alberto’s due process claim, however, we need not 
reach the question whether this motion was denied in error.  
Instead, Serrano-Alberto’s petition for review of that order 
will be denied as moot because the IJ assigned on remand 
from the BIA will have jurisdiction to consider “any and all 
matters which [he] deems appropriate in the exercise of his 
administrative discretion or which are brought to his attention 
in compliance with the appropriate regulations,” Johnson, 286 
F.3d at 701 (quoting Matter of Patel, 16 I. & N. Dec. 600, 
601 (BIA 1978)), including the evidence incorporated into 
Serrano-Alberto’s motion to reopen, see Matter of Y-S-L-C, 
26 I. & N. Dec. at 691. 
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on a respondent’s testimony and thereby limit his or her 
ability to fully develop the facts of the claim,” Matter of Y-S-
L-C-, 26 I. & N. Dec. at 690, and when this type of “belittling 
. . . and insensitive” conduct occurs, id. at 691, it is 
“appropriate to . . . remand . . . for a new hearing before a 
different Immigration Judge,” id.  Such was the case in both 
Wang and Cham, where we urged reassignment in view of the 
due process violations we identified in those cases, see Wang, 
423 F.3d at 271; Cham, 445 F.3d at 694; see also Myrie, 855 
F.3d at 511, 518.  And such is undoubtedly the case here as 
well.   
IV. Conclusion 
 For the foregoing reasons, we will grant Serrano-
Alberto’s petition for review of the BIA’s order denying his 
applications for asylum, withholding of removal, and 
protection under CAT, vacate that order, and remand to the 
BIA for proceedings consistent with this opinion.  We will 
also deny as moot Serrano-Alberto’s petition for review of the 
BIA’s denial of his motion to reopen.   
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